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Tax avoidance by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is a global problem. Most cross-
border trade occurs within MNEs, susceptible to abuse of gaps and loopholes 
in domestic and international tax law that allow “profit shifting” between fiscal 
jurisdictions in order to reduce corporate tax liability. A lack of transparency makes 
this kind of tax avoidance difficult to quantify – let alone to monitor and control. 
This paper provides a case study of profit shifting using publicly available, unique, 
country-by-country reporting data for Vodafone Group Plc, the first large MNE 
to voluntarily publish such data. We show the tax impact of a move to formulary 
apportionment on a global basis, and under the European Union’s Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposal. We also consider the rationale for the 
current proposals for apportionment factors and propose an alternative.
Keywords: transfer pricing, formulary apportionment, CCCTB, developing countries, 
tax avoidance, horizontal equity, vertical equity, equal distribution, taxing rights
1. Introduction
The avoidance of corporation tax by multinational enterprises (MNEs) – essentially on 
behalf of their shareholders – is facilitated by current international tax rules, based on 
the separate entity and arm’s length principles. MNEs are able to exploit this system 
to minimise their tax liability, by shifting profits to countries with low or zero tax rates, 
undermining the tax base of those where real activities take place and reducing 
government revenues worldwide, in both developed and developing countries.
The scale of this profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions – known to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as “conduits” – is very large, involving as much as two-fifths of 
MNE profits. It has also exacerbated tax competition between countries: the global 
average statutory corporate tax rate has fallen by more than half over the past three 
decades (Zucman et al., 2018).
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Offshore investment hubs also play a major role in global investment. Some 30% 
of cross-border corporate investment stocks have been routed through conduit 
countries before reaching their destination as productive assets, and a logical 
corollary of the outsized role of offshore hubs in global corporate investments is tax 
planning (UNCTAD, 2015).
In consequence, G20 world leaders in 2013 gave their support to the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) project on base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS), calling for reform of the rules to ensure that MNEs would 
be taxed “where economic activities occur and value is created”.1 However, the 
approach taken under the BEPS project2 still relies on transfer pricing rules, which 
start from the independent entity principle and transactional analysis, the so called 
“arm’s length principle”. Unfortunately, this principle is extraordinarily difficult to 
apply objectively in practice.
Alternatives to the arm’s length principle do exist (Faccio and Picciotto, 2017) and a 
logical alternative (ICRICT, 2018) would be to assess multinationals on a worldwide 
basis (country-by-country reporting, or CbCR) and apportion profits (that is, the 
tax base) by a formula which would allocate a firm’s worldwide income across 
countries, based on allocation factors that reflect real economic activities (e.g. 
sales, employees, assets). Domestic corporate taxes would be paid on the share 
of the worldwide income that is allocated to each jurisdiction.
Such apportionment systems do exist, of course, within federal states. Historically, 
many US states have used the so-called “Massachusetts formula”, which uses 
equal weights on property, payroll and sales, to assess local corporate tax liability 
from national accounts. Canada employs a similar system, but with equal weights 
on gross receipts and payroll. Following a similar logic, the European Union (EU) 
has recently decided to relaunch a project for a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB)3 based on formulary apportionment, with a decision expected 
by the end of 2018.
Initial estimates by the IMF – discussed below – of the effect of such a system, using 
aggregate data for US firms overseas, indicate that the tax revenue gains would be 
large for both developed and developing countries, the impact depending on the 
weights used in the apportionment formula (IMF, 2014). Previous studies using firm-
level data (Clausing and Lahav, 2011; Krchniva, 2014) are based on extrapolation 
1 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0905-tax.html, paragraph 7. 
2 http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions.htm.
3 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-consolidated-corporate-
tax-base-ccctb_en.
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from multinationals’ financial information available in databases or from financial 
statements. However, there have been no studies using publicly available CbCR 
data for multinational firms covering a large number of countries, both developed 
and developing.
The purpose of this paper is to examine in detail the scale of profit shifting and 
the effects of apportionment at the firm level, using CbCR recently published by 
Vodafone Group Plc. Vodafone is the first multinational group to voluntarily publish 
CbCR data, and we hope that its effort to increase transparency by publishing basic 
financial and qualitative information for each of the countries in which it operates will 
be followed by other multinational groups. Section 2 explores the tax apportionment 
issue and establishes three models to be applied to this data. The Vodafone data 
are presented in Section 3, and the results of the three apportionment models are 
discussed. Section 4 examines critically the logical basis for these apportionment 
proposals and sketches a possible alternative based on equity criteria. Section 5 
concludes with some implications for future research and policy discussion.
2. Formulary apportionment
Tax avoidance by MNEs is a global problem. The greater part of cross-border 
commerce takes place within MNEs, with an estimated two-thirds of global trade 
involving related parties (UNCTAD, 2013). This type of trade is susceptible to 
abusive exploitation of gaps and loopholes in domestic and international tax law 
that allow for “profit shifting” from country to country, with the intention of reducing 
the taxes paid on profits. A lack of transparency makes this kind of tax avoidance 
difficult to quantify, let alone monitor or prevent.
Under the arm’s length principle, which underlies separate entity accounting, a 
multinational corporate group should price transactions with its affiliated entities 
as if those transactions had occurred with unrelated entities. For tax purposes, 
affiliated businesses should set transfer prices at levels that would have prevailed 
had the transactions occurred between unrelated parties.
Multinationals are therefore required to identify market-based prices for goods and 
services transferred within the multinational, to obtain a price that approximates the 
result that independent entities would reach in the market.
Transfer pricing rules attempt to construct prices for the transactions among entities that 
are part of MNEs as if they were independent. This is inconsistent with the economic 
reality of modern-day MNEs, which are unified firms run by a single  management 
entity and organised to reap the benefits of integration across jurisdictions. This 
approach requires subjective, ad hoc and discretionary evaluation of each taxpayer by 
tax authorities in the different jurisdictions in which the taxpayer operates.
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This system also requires significant resources from skilled tax authorities and 
maintains the incentive for multinationals to create ever more complex group 
structures to minimise taxes (e.g. investment schemes involving offshore financial 
centres and special purpose entities) (UNCTAD, 2016).
Profits can be shifted between the affiliates of multinationals in many ways, through 
the provision of services or sale of goods (multinational groups can manipulate intra-
group exports and import prices so that subsidiaries in high-tax countries export 
goods and services at low prices to related firms in low-tax countries and import 
from them at high prices; such transfer price manipulations reduce profits in high-
tax countries and increase them in low-tax countries), through intra-group lending 
(affiliates in high-tax countries borrow money from affiliates in low-tax countries, 
which again reduces profits in high-tax countries and increases them in low-tax 
countries) and the licensing of intangible assets (e.g. proprietary trademarks, logos 
and patents owned by affiliates in low-tax countries are licensed to other affiliates 
within the group; these affiliates then receive royalties which reduce profits in high-
tax countries).
An alternative to the arms-length approach, espoused by the OECD in the BEPS 
project, would be to tax multinationals under formulary apportionment. Under 
formulary apportionment, multinationals are treated as a unitary business based 
on the legal and economic control the parent corporation exercises over its 
subsidiaries. This unitary business is treated as a single taxpayer, and its income 
is calculated by subtracting worldwide expenses from worldwide income, based 
on a global common accounting system. The resulting net income is apportioned 
among taxing jurisdictions on the basis of a formula that takes into account various 
agreed factors (e.g. sales, employees). Each jurisdiction then applies its tax rate to 
the income apportioned to it by the formula and collects the amount of tax resulting 
from this calculation.
As the global profits of the multinational are distributed across different jurisdictions 
on the basis of an agreed formula, the multinational would not need to calculate 
the taxable profits earned by each entity of the group in each jurisdiction. In fact, 
formulary apportionment is currently adopted in the United States and Canada for 
the intra-country allocation of the profits of a single entity or a group of entities.
In the experience of US states, income has been allocated to state jurisdictions 
using a variety of formulas. Historically, many states have used the so-called 
“Massachusetts formula”, which employs equal weights on property, payroll and 
sales, although, over the years, a significant number of states have moved to a 
formula that gives more weight to the sales factor (Mintz, 2007). Canada uses equal 
weights on gross receipts and payroll, with each factor weighted by one-half.
The experience of these countries show that implementation challenges mainly 
hinge on the apportionment system and the lack of uniformity across states (e.g. 
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how the elements of the apportionment formulae are defined) and the lack of 
consolidation. The importance of gaining agreement among states on a common 
tax base and common formula is a crucial insight from the experience in the United 
States and Canada (Weiner, 2005). Despite these challenges, the experience of 
these two countries provides a useful blueprint for the adoption of this system at 
the international level.
Under a proposed formulary apportionment system, firms would no longer have an 
artificial tax incentive to shift income to low-tax locations where their real economic 
activity is not located. A move to formulary apportionment would also reduce 
the distortionary features of the current tax system, reducing its complexity and 
administrative burden.
By ignoring internal arrangements that lead to BEPS, formulary apportionment 
would enormously simplify international tax rules, ending the need for the complex 
rules on hybrids, source of income, treaty abuse, and the like. It would also lead 
to a significant reduction in conflict and uncertainty, by dispensing with ad hoc 
decisions that require subjective value judgements.
A move to formulary apportionment would also be cost effective and simple for 
MNEs, as they would need to prepare a global tax return to be submitted to the 
tax authorities in each of the countries where the multinational operates. There 
would be an initial setup cost for the appropriate accounting system, but this would 
be significantly lower than the current cost of implementing, documenting and 
defending transfer pricing structures under the arm’s length approach.
Through formulary apportionment, tax authorities and government would have a 
better understanding of MNEs’ profit allocation across countries. Such a system 
would also be more suited to an integrated world economy and result in simplification 
gains and administrative savings.
Although a country could introduce formulary apportionment unilaterally, by 
requiring MNEs to determine what element of their global profits is taxable in that 
country, a shift towards formulary apportionment is likely to require coordination 
to facilitate a move to this system, negotiate an appropriate formula and address 
some of the associated technical issues (e.g. definition of a common tax base, 
procedure for consolidation of profits and compliance).
So far, formulary apportionment has been tested only on a country level in a limited 
number of countries (e.g. the United States and Canada), so a coordinated global 
move to formulary apportionment would likely be complex, but not more complex 
than the current system and, in any event, more closely aligned to the economic 
reality of the modern world.
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The EU has recently decided to relaunch a project for a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)4, a single set of rules to calculate companies’ taxable 
profits in the EU based on formulary apportionment. With the CCCTB, cross-border 
companies would have to only comply with a single EU system for computing their 
taxable income, rather than many national rulebooks, and would be able to offset 
losses in one Member State against profits in another. The consolidated taxable 
profits would be shared between the Member States in which the group is active, 
using an apportionment formula. Each Member State would then tax its share of 
the profits at its own national tax rate.
It is to be expected that the redistributive effect of the re-apportionment of the 
tax base would be considerable, although, as yet, there are no reliable estimates 
of the scale. Figure 1 summarizes the estimates made by the IMF on the basis 
of data for US firms operating abroad in 2010 (IMF, 2014). Three elements of the 
apportionment model are considered separately, each allocated according to its 
location in the respective tax jurisdiction: sales, payroll and employment. As the 
Fund points out (2014, p. 38), “These are no more than illustrative, but point to large 
and systematic effects. Advanced economies generally gain tax base, whichever 
factor is used, while substantial tax base moves out of conduit countries; emerging 
and developing economies clearly gain base only if heavy weight is placed on 
employment.”
The category of “conduit” countries as defined by the IMF (2014, p. 18) “refers to 
countries that are widely perceived as attractive intermediate destinations in the 
routing of investments—whether for tax or other reasons”. The IMF (2014) identifies 
Bermuda, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland as 
“conduit” countries.
Specifically, as Figure 1 indicates, conduit jurisdictions see large reductions (between 
50 and 100%) in their tax bases for all four apportionment factors, as would be 
expected. Further, developed countries experience broadly similar increases in their 
tax bases under all four factors – of between 30 and 50%. In other words, as far 
as these two groups of countries are concerned – and assuming that US firms are 
representative of all MNEs – the redistributive effect would be robust to the precise 
apportionment formula used.
The same, however, is not true of developing countries, where each factor (and 
thus its weight in the formula) has a radically different effect – due essentially to 
the asymmetrical allocation of these factors between developed and developing 
countries by MNEs. Specifically, developing countries gain from employment 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-consolidated-corporate-
tax-base-ccctb_en.
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factors and lose from asset factors, as economic theory would predict, due to 
the lower capital-labour ratios (i.e. technologies) used by firms there as compared 
with developed countries. The payroll factor actually leads to revenue losses for 
developing countries because wages are much higher in developed countries.5 
However, the sales factor seems to benefit developed and developing countries 
to a similar degree, although in absolute terms the gains are much greater to 
developed countries, owing to their greater national incomes and thus tax bases. 
In sum, unlike developed countries, the gains for tax bases in developing countries 
from the different models of apportionment do depend crucially on the weights 
given to the factors in the respective formulae.
Absent a comprehensive international database for MNEs similar to that maintained 
by the US Department of Commerce, an alternative approach to assessing 
apportionment rules would be to look at individual MNEs. To one such unique case 
we now turn.
5 Broadly speaking, wage and salary levels are correlated with levels of national income per capita 
(ILO, 2016).
Figure 1. IMF estimate of reallocation of taxable income of US MNEs, using
 alternative factors (percentage change) 
Source: IMF (2014), Appendix VII.   
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3. The Vodafone case study
Enhancing transparency in the way MNEs report and publish their accounts would 
help tackle tax avoidance at very low cost. Despite publishing their consolidated 
accounts as if they are unified entities, MNEs are not taxed in this way. Each 
business entity within an MNE is taxed individually, making it difficult to establish 
an overview of what is happening within a group of companies for tax purposes. 
This would be different if reporting were done on a country-by-country basis. Public 
country-by-country reporting  (CbCR) is the publication of a defined set of facts 
and figures by large MNEs, thereby providing the public with a global picture of the 
taxes that MNEs pay on their corporate income and the allocation of profits across 
the group’s entities. CbCR data is considered to be suitable for high-level transfer 
pricing risk assessment and for evaluating other BEPS related risks.6
Vodafone is the first large multinational7 to have voluntarily published country-
by-country data, in a report titled Vodafone Group Plc – Taxation and our total 
economic contribution to public finances 2016-2017.8 The data provided by the 
Group for 2016-17 (see Appendix to this paper) allows the identification of the sixty 
countries where the Group operates, the scale of operations in each country, and 
the allocation of group taxable profits across the different countries in which the 
Group operates.
Although the data Vodafone supplies fall short of the country-by-country data that 
MNEs will eventually have to file with tax authorities across the world as part of the 
OECD CbCR guidelines,9 as well as of the EU proposal for a directive on corporate 
tax transparency country-by-country reporting10, and of the data advocated by tax 
justice campaigners,11 these data do finally provide country-by-country information 
on the revenue and taxable profits, corporate tax payments, employees and assets 
of the multinational.
A review of the Vodafone report shows that overall taxable profits (profits before 
tax) for the Group for 2016-17 amounted to €1.9 billion on revenue of €57.1 billion, 
a relatively narrow profit margin of 3%.12 It is unfortunately not possible to calculate 
6 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinationals and Tax Administrations, p235.
7 Other than those credit and investment firms (e.g. banks) subject to the requirements of the EU Capital 
Requirements Directive 4 introduced in 2013 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF.
8 https://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/sustainability/pdfs/vodafone_2017_tax.pdf.
9 http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/guidance-on-country-by-country-reporting-beps-action-13.htm.
10 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/proposal-directive-corporate-tax-transparency-country-
country-reporting_en.
11 https://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/country-by-country/.
12 Although it should be recalled that shareholders also benefit from any increase in capital value of the 
Group.
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potential Group tax in the aggregate because liability depends on the tax regime in 
each jurisdiction and the distribution of the tax base, as well as adjustments from 
previous years.
The full data base in the Appendix to this paper clearly shows the misalignment 
between the current taxable profit allocation and indicators of the Group’s real 
economic activities (sales, employees and assets) in the countries where Vodafone 
operates and thus the potential for BEPS activities by the Group through the use 
of low-tax “conduit” countries.13 Table 1 shows the Group revenue, profit before 
tax, employment, assets and tax paid for the 10 largest country operations, which 
accounted for some 70% of Group activity by sales. We have also calculated the 
effective tax rate paid (tax paid divided by profit before tax). Data for a single year 
are not always representative: nonetheless it is notable that six of these 10 country 
operations reported losses; and one country (Italy) achieved an effective tax rate 
well below the statutory “headline” rate. In contrast, sales revenue does seem 
broadly correlated with employment and assets, once the relative capital intensity 
of developed and developing countries, discussed above, is taken into account.
Table 2, in contrast, shows the top ten Vodafone countries of operations ranked 
by size of reported profits. The most notable feature is the size of profits reported 
13 It should be stressed that we are in no way suggesting that Vodafone has engaged in any illegal tax 
practices. 
Table 1.  Vodafone Group countries of operations, top 10 countries ranked by 
revenues, 2016–2017 (€ millions)
  Country Revenue Profi t before
tax
Employees Assets Corporation 
tax
1 Germany 10619 -636 15714 1925 89
2 United Kingdom 7536 -504 17951 1491 -89
3 India 6847 -338 23836 1313 340
4 Italy 6249 686 7339 881 87
5 Spain 4983 -74 5188 748 0
6 South Africa 4187 1077 5213 544 359
7 Turkey 3053 -59 3410 336 61
8 Netherlands 1867 -7 3601 303 -15
9 Egypt 1334 268 8381 208 110
10 New Zealand 1311 47 2965 144 19
Source: Appendix.
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in Luxembourg, far larger than sales (although these are commensurate with 
employment), and in Malta, leading inevitably to the hypothesis that these two are 
the main conduit countries for the Group, with reported profits roughly equal to net 
profits for the Group as a whole and very low effective tax rates.
In sum, it is clear that considerable profit shifting is occurring within the Vodafone 
Group – whether for reasons of “tax planning” or “commercial reasons” is unclear 
but fortunately we do not have to resolve this issue here. However, the data do 
permit us to see how different models of global formulary apportionment might 
affect the way the Vodafone tax base is distributed across tax jurisdictions and 
thus provide a firm-level case study comparable to the aggregate-level IMF study 
discussed above. 
Figure 2 shows how these profits (that is, the corporation tax base) are distributed 
between regions, based on the World Bank’s classification14 of low-income, lower-
middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income countries. This aggregation 
also helps to smooth out some of the noise inherent in the individual country 
figures. Vodafone’s profits are reported to be 1% to low-income countries, 14% to 
lower-middle-income countries, 27% to upper-middle-income countries, 19% to 
high-income countries and 38% – the largest share of all – to the “conduit group” 
of Malta and Luxembourg.
14 https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519
Table 2.  Vodafone Group countries of operations, top 10 countries ranked by profi ts, 
2016–2017 (€ millions)
  Country Revenue Profi t before 
tax
Employees Assets Corporation 
tax
Effective 
tax rate (%)
1 Luxembourg 187 1450 325 17 5 0.3
2 South Africa 4187 1077 5213 544 359 33.3
3 Italy 6249 686 7339 881 87 12.7
4 Kenya 810 293 1729 126 118 40.3
5 Egypt 1334 268 8381 208 110 41.0
6 Malta 86 124 347 14 9 7.3
7 New Zealand 1311 47 2965 144 19 40.4
8 Romania 774 39 4197 146 6 15.4
9 Czech Republic 507 32 1694 92 4 12.5
10 Tanzania 386 29 556 62 23 79.3
Source: Appendix.
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Our first apportionment exercise is based on equal weighting of sales, assets and 
payroll,15 as an approximation of the US (“Massachusetts”) formula (Figure 3). This 
weighting would decrease the global distribution of Group profits attributable to 
developing countries (low-income and lower-middle income countries in the World 
Bank definition) from 15% to 13%, which would indicate that using a factor that 
takes into account wage costs may not be beneficial for developing countries.
However, replacing the payroll factor with employment (i.e. number of employees 
per country) increases the global distribution of Group profits attributable to 
developing countries, from 15% to 23% (Figure 4). In both scenarios, the major 
gainers would be the developed countries (upper-middle-income and high-income 
countries), nearly doubling their share, while the conduit group is, of course, the 
main loser.
Figure 5 shows an apportionment based on sales and number of employees only, 
equally weighted. The share attributable to developing countries rises slightly 
compared to Figure 4, at the expense of developed countries, as might be expected 
– although less so than the IMF estimates discussed above.
15 Unfortunately, no payroll figures are provided in the Vodafone data, only employment figures. However, 
the International Labour Organisation states that there is a close correlation between national wage/
salary rates and income per capita (ILO, 2016). We have thus used the ratios between income per capita 
for our four country groups, as given by the World Bank database in 2017 (https://data.worldbank.org/
products/wdi), as a proxy for the earnings ratios, and then applied these to the Vodafone employment 
data to derive the appropriate apportionment of the ‘payroll’ element.
Figure 2. Distribution of reported Vodafone prots by region, 2016–2017 (%)
Low-income countries 
Lower-middle income countries 
Upper-middle income countries 
High-income countries 
Malta and Luxembourg 
1
38.1 
14.4 
27.2 
19.3 
Source: Appendix.   
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An apportionment based on sales alone, as some would propose, yields the results 
in Figure 6. This allocation further increases the share of developed countries but at 
the expense of developing ones.
In sum, the introduction of formulary apportionment does result in a major 
reassignment of the tax base, mainly to the benefit of developed countries, although 
developing countries also gain considerably. Although overall it is likely that different 
apportionment formulae would not fundamentally alter the outcome for developed 
countries, the impact on developing countries could be significant.
Figure 3. Vodafone prot allocation using rst formulary apportionment 
 (equally weighted sales, payroll and assets factors) (%)
Low-income countries 
Lower-middle income countries 
Upper-middle income countries 
High-income countries 
Malta and Luxembourg 
1.10.6
12.3
9.7
76.3
Source: Appendix.   
Figure 4. Vodafone prot allocation using second formulary apportionment 
 (equally weighted sales, employment and assets factors) (%)
Low-income countries 
Lower-middle income countries 
Upper-middle income countries 
High-income countries 
Malta and Luxembourg 
1.60.5
21.6
12.2
64.2
Source: Appendix.   
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The data suggest that the use of an employment factor would be likely to result in higher 
allocation of profits to developing countries, relative to the use of the payroll factor.
Finally, we simulate how the Group profits would be allocated according to the 
proposed EU CCCTB – sales, employees16 and assets equally weighted – between 
16 As no payroll data are provided in the CbCR data, and nearly all EU Member States in which the Group 
operates are high-income countries, no payroll adjustment has been made.
Figure 5. Vodafone prot allocation using third formulary apportionment 
 (equally weighted sales and employment factors) (%)
Low-income countries 
Lower-middle income countries 
Upper-middle income countries 
High-income countries 
Malta and Luxembourg 
1.50.5
23.5
12.8
61.6
Source: Appendix.   
Figure 6. Vodafone prot allocation using fourth formulary apportionment 
 (sales factor only) (%)
Low-income countries 
Lower-middle income countries 
Upper-middle income countries 
High-income countries 
Malta and Luxembourg 
1.70.5
16.5
14.3
67.1
Source: Appendix.   
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the EU Member States individually. Figure 7 shows that, as expected, the clear 
losers would be Luxembourg and Malta, which would lose almost all their present 
Vodafone tax base, as well as Italy. Clear winners would be Germany and the United 
Kingdom, with significant increases also showing for Spain, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. The United Kingdom and Germany are Vodafone’s top two countries for 
revenues and are also among their top 10 countries for number of employees, but 
losses before tax are currently reported for these two countries and this explains 
why a movement to formulary apportionment would be particularly beneficial to 
these two countries. The balance of the loss to conduit states would, of course, 
accrue to the rest of the world – both developed and developing.
Figure 7. Vodafone prot allocation using fourth formulary apportionment 
 (EU CCCTB- difference from current allocation) (€ millions)
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4. Apportionment and equity issues
The previous section examined in detail a particular case, although a significant 
one because Vodafone is a relatively large, global (with CbCR data reported for 49 
countries) and technologically advanced MNE. We have shown how profit shifting 
occurs and what the redistributive effect of various reapportionment formulae 
would be if applied to this case. The results are interesting and consistent with the 
IMF study of US MNEs, with the main gainers from reapportionment indicated to 
be the tax authorities of developed countries, as might be expected; within the EU 
the main gainers would be Germany and the United Kingdom.
We have taken the factors (sales, assets, employment and payroll) and the 
formulae (US, Canada and EU) for apportionment from the current international 
policy framework. Almost inevitably these formulae have emerged from political 
negotiation over fiscal resources rather than a coherent economic or political 
theory. Above all, they have emerged within federal polities where there are other 
redistributive mechanisms, particularly the allocation of the resources generated by 
corporate taxation. There is no reason therefore why such formulae should be best 
for an international non-federal system other than that these formulae form a useful 
precedent for negotiating.
The three canonical criteria for judging taxation are “equity, efficiency and ease”.17 
As the staff of the US Congress states:
Analysts generally apply three principal economic criteria when judging 
the merits of any tax system: Does that tax system increase or decrease 
equity across taxpayers? Does it increase or decrease economic 
efficiency (that is, the extent to which market decisions are free of 
distortions introduced by the tax)? And can that tax system be easily 
administered? (JCT, 2008, p. 48)
“Ease” refers to administrative feasibility and cost on the one hand, and transparency 
on the other. It is clear that formulary apportionment in any form is superior in “ease” 
to the present system of conflicting jurisdictions, and that, by effectively eliminating 
conduits, it would raise tax revenue without great administrative cost because MNE 
groups already prepare CbCR for their internal use.
“Efficiency” in the sense of reducing market distortions is clearly achieved by 
any formulary apportionment because it would eliminate the enormous present 
complexity and distortions created by tax avoidance schemes and the use of 
artificial conduits.
17 See, for instance, Meade (1976).
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There is less clarity about the first criterion, that of “Equity”. Internationally (and 
indeed between federal states) this concept in the present context relates not 
so much to individual taxpayers but rather to equity in distribution between tax 
jurisdictions. This of course is the rationale behind the three formulae discussed 
above, which aim to achieve a more equitable distribution of tax base (and thus 
revenue) between countries.
The somewhat scarce policy literature on the subject appears to be based on a 
concept of taxing profits “where economic activities occur and value is created”. 
The OECD intergovernmental agreements on BEPS refer to the need for the tax 
base to “reflect the underlying economic reality”18 without explicitly stating how this 
is to be defined; while the Independent Commission on the Reform of International 
Corporate Taxation states that
“… these factors, such as employment, sales,  resources used, fixed 
assets, etc., should be chosen to reflect the MNE’s real economic activity 
in each jurisdiction” (page 6) and that “It is the Commission view that 
global  formulary apportionment is the only method  that allocates 
profits in a balanced way using  factors reflecting both supply (e.g., 
assets,  employees, resources used) and demand  (sales). Neither can 
create value without the other.” (ICRICT, 2018, p. 7)
However, while such an approach to the creation of “value” has some appeal 
in terms of political economy, there is little economic theory to underpin it. The 
so-called “Massachusetts Formula” apparently has become accepted through 
precedent (i.e. political negotiation between states) rather than as the result of 
economic analysis or research into the impact. A line of argument might be derived 
from the “contribution of factors of production” approach with, say, the location of 
“land”, “labour” and “capital”; but this would exclude sales and extend the definition 
of assets.
Moreover, from a textbook standpoint, profits are attributable to capital alone 
because the other factors are rewarded according to their marginal productivity; 
and, of course, in the standard neoclassical model (with no scale economies), profits 
are the marginal productivity of capital itself plus the reward to entrepreneurship. 
On this basis, apportionment should be based on the true location of real fixed 
capital, technology and management or entrepreneurship.
In neither approach does sales come into the economic argument. The case for 
including sales seems to be based more on ease of administration than anything 
else. However, the attraction of this case is that it ultimately implies replacing direct 
with indirect taxation – which in turn has undesirable consequences for equity (IMF, 
18 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm.
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2013). Corporation tax is, in essence, a withholding tax on dividends and is thus 
strongly progressive, reducing income inequality; sales taxes on the other hand are 
usually regressive.
Moreover, the “value creation” approach seems to misunderstand the fact that 
large firms’ profits arise from market power (including intellectual property and 
the like) and specifically from their multinational nature – or to put it another way, 
these are spatially unlocated rents that should be taxed. As Avi-Yonah and Clausing 
(2007, p. 13) explain:
multinational firms exist in large part because these interactions generate 
more income than would separate domestic firms interacting at arms-
length; thus requiring firms to allocate this additional income among 
domestic tax bases is necessarily artificial and arbitrary, because it would 
by definition disappear if the related entities operated at arm’s length.
Finally, assessment of the distributive effects of different apportionment schemes 
should take into account not only the direct impact on different countries’ revenues 
but also the response of companies to the new rules. For instance, a company 
could sub-contract its labour inputs in any one jurisdiction and thus could shift its 
tax liability under formulary apportionment. What this illustrates is the problem of 
effectively assessing value chains that stretch across sectors and countries, where 
effective control may be exercised not only by ownership but also by contracts, 
technology, franchising and other means.
In addition, we have already seen how apportionment systems would necessarily 
benefit developed countries most (at the expense of conduit countries, some of 
them developing countries) because this is where most sales, capital and high 
wages are to be found.
There is a case therefore for examining what other criteria might be used to underpin 
the formula for international apportionment. Here we will briefly sketch just one19 in 
outline, the application of an apportionment principle of equity between countries 
that is based on income per capita.
When designing personal income taxation it is conventional to include an element 
of progressivity on the grounds of the greater “ability to pay” of richer strata of 
the population – or in economic terms, the declining marginal utility of money 
with income. This is normally called “vertical equity” in contrast to “horizontal 
19 There are other possibilities, of course. For instance, apportionment might be linked to the need to 
finance global public goods, and thus involve some fraction being allocated directly to global funds for 
the environment, epidemics, natural disasters and so on. Again, to the extent that corporation tax can 
be seen as a ‘service charge’ for the use of national public facilities, apportionment might reflect the 
extent of these facilities.
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equity”, which ensures that taxpayers at similar income levels pay similar amounts, 
independently of the source of income.
By extension, we could argue that current apportionment proposals are mainly 
concerned with horizontal equity between jurisdictions, but that, logically, 
an element of vertical equity should also be introduced. In other words, the 
apportionment weights should be based on – or at least include – the level of 
per capita national income, to ensure a more equal distribution of taxing rights 
(i.e. how the multinational’s tax base is shared between developed and developing 
countries).
This may appear to be a radical proposal, but it does have indirect precedents. On 
the one hand, within federal polities (upon which the current formulae are based) 
there does exist – implicitly – a strong redistributive element insofar as federal direct 
taxation is “returned” in the form of fiscal transfers on a notionally per capita basis. 
On the other, the current system of international development cooperation (“aid”) 
is essentially fiscal, involving the raising of taxation in the donor country and the 
support of public expenditure20 in the recipient country.
A somewhat more conventional form of this proposal would parallel the special 
provisions in trade agreements for less developed participants. In terms of formulary 
apportionment this could take the form of an agreed adjustment factor for the three 
developing-country groupings discussed in the previous section.
A move to formulary apportionment, either based on existing apportionment 
formulae or on our proposal would have effect both on the tax revenue generated 
and investment decisions by MNEs.
Whilst taxation is only one of the factors on which investment decisions are based, 
in addition to eliminate opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting, a system 
of formulary apportionment could remove the inherent subjectivity of the current 
system of international tax rules thereby providing greater economic certainty 
to taxpayers and governments, and this should in turn encourage cross-border 
investment.
The risk of double taxation in the current system is high, with multiple countries 
asserting taxing rights on the same tax base. However, under a system of formulary 
apportionment investors will be able to predict in advance of the investment decision 
the effective rates at which each country will impose its tax, therefore increasing tax 
certainty.
20 Most expenditure by international non-governmental organizations in developing countries is fiscally 
funded too, and although ‘privately spent’ is usually in support of or a replacement for provision of 
public welfare.
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5. Conclusion
The analytical and empirical evidence in this paper shows that a move to formulary 
apportionment is likely to minimise the allocation of MNEs’ profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions, where multinationals have limited economic activities. The profits 
currently allocated to these jurisdictions would be reallocated to both developed 
and developing countries.
Research on this subject has been constrained by the lack of firm-level data. 
However, the results from a detailed examination in this paper of the CbCR data 
of Vodafone Group Plc, the first large multinational to voluntarily publish such data, 
allow us to demonstrate the profit-shifting process and to estimate the effect of 
formulary apportionment for a major MNE based in the United Kingdom, which 
supports the aggregate analysis of US corporations overseas by the IMF.
We also suggest that the current formula proposals are limited by a lack of clear 
economic rationale, on the one hand, and insufficient attention to the equitable 
treatment of developing countries, on the other.
The policy implications of this paper are four. First, clearly much more research 
covering a longer time period is needed at the firm level. Ideally this would be 
comprehensive, but if not possible then a representative selection should be made 
of MNEs in distinct sectors and based in distinct countries. In particular, MNEs 
based outside the US and EU (particularly those from emerging-market economies) 
should be well covered.
Second, policy debate should move on from the need for formulary apportionment 
to the nature of the formula and participation in its determination, with particular 
attention to low-income countries. There appears to be some current momentum 
towards basing apportionment on sales, driven in good part by concerns about 
e-commerce, but this may not be helpful to developing countries.
Third, although formulary apportionment does not require a global body to collect or 
redistribute tax, it does require a multilateral forum where rules can be established, 
methodology approved and disputes arbitrated. These rules would cover not only 
the apportionment formula as such but also the reconciliation of national and regional 
differences in accounting criteria and tax expensing. Whether the OECD (which 
has already made progress on these topics) or the UN (which has representational 
legitimacy) should be the locus for such an initiative is an open question.
Fourth, a clear linkage should be established between debates on international 
taxation and other global debates on income inequality, sustainable development 
and multilateral institutions. Fiscal coordination is not just an issue of financing for 
development but rather one of the bases for global economic cooperation as such. 
In these debates, developing countries should have both voice and vote.
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